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Thank you so much, Dean Page and Professor Wasserman, FIU faculty, 
students, and fellow panelists. This is dazzling company, and it is a privilege 
to be aiding, I hope, your digestion with this lunchtime lecture. 
My quick comment on the morning’s panels is to voice nearly full 
agreement. From one angle or another, each speaker set up very nicely one 
of the two topics that I plan to address. 
One is Justice Robert H. Jackson. I come to Barnette as a law professor 
and also as a biographer—I am interested in the constitutional law, and also 
in Justice Jackson the person. The author of the Court’s opinion in West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette1 interests me at least as much 
as does its law. Many of the perspectives that have been voiced here 
regarding Barnette and Jackson, including comments on the decision, his 
 
*Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law, New York City, and Elizabeth S. Lenna Fellow, 
Robert H. Jackson Center, Jamestown, New York. This publication is based on my October 5, 2018, 
keynote address at Florida International University College of Law’s symposium “Barnette at 75: The 
Past, Present, and Future of the ‘Fixed Star in Our Constitutional Constellation.’” Video of this program 
is available at https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/lawreviewsymposia/Barnette/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2019).  
I am very grateful to Professor Howard Wasserman for organizing this excellent symposium, to 
Dean Antony Page and everyone at FIU for their great planning, arrangements, and hospitality, to the FIU 
Law Review editors for their work on the symposium and this publication, to the late Bennett Boskey 
(1916–2016) for his friendship and guidance, and to Max D. Bartell for sharp and diligent research 
assistance. Copyright © 2019 by John Q. Barrett. All rights reserved. 
1 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
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opinion, doctrine, absence of doctrine, literary skill, music, prayer, and so 
forth are views that I share, deeply. It is a great set-up to hear them voiced so 
well. 
In addition to discussing Justice Jackson, I also will address a second 
topic that, to my surprise, did not come up so far in this symposium, except 
implicitly or in passing. That topic is Jehovah’s Witnesses. They were the 
religious believers who became litigants. They were repeat players in a run 
of 1930s and 1940s United States Supreme Court cases and decisions that 
included, in 1943, Barnette. 
I will address Justice Jackson and Jehovah’s Witnesses in four parts. 
First, I will begin with Robert Jackson himself, introducing the man who 
became a Supreme Court Justice, and who came to author Barnette and at 
least one other very notable opinion in a Jehovah’s Witness case. Second, I 
will turn to the Barnette case in its Supreme Court legal context, which turns 
out to be two Court terms, 1941–42 and 1942–43, of many Jehovah’s 
Witnesses cases. These cases produced a run of Court decisions that are a 
framework surrounding Barnette, and thus understanding them is important 
to understanding it—Barnette was one of many decisions regarding 
Jehovah’s Witnesses, not a decision standing alone. Third, I will turn back to 
discussing Justice Jackson, the author of Barnette, and how his opinion there 
was a piece of his judging overall in the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ cases. Finally, 
I will conclude by pointing to some of Robert Jackson’s life experiences that 
one can see, at least between the lines, in his Jehovah’s Witness case 
opinions.  
I. ROBERT H. JACKSON BEFORE HE BECAME JUSTICE JACKSON 
Robert Houghwout Jackson’s life, 1892 to 1954, was not long, but it 
was full and varied—he achieved much before heart disease got the best of 
him at age 62, shortly after he was part of the unanimous Supreme Court 
decision in Brown v. Board of Education.2 
Jackson’s life was an arc that really is the story of the rising, modern 
United States. As his former law clerk Justice William Rehnquist once noted, 
Jackson was a lot like Abraham Lincoln, who, born almost ninety years 
earlier, also traveled from rural isolation to law, politics, high national office, 
and permanent significance.3 Jackson became not only a great U.S. Supreme 
 
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954). For details on Jackson’s life, see my Introduction in ROBERT H. JACKSON, 
THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, at xiii–xix (John Q. Barrett, ed., 
2003). 
3 See William H. Rehnquist, Robert H. Jackson: A Perspective Twenty-Five Years Later, 44 ALB. 
L. REV. 533, 536 (1979–1980) (noting “Jackson’s remarkable similarity to Abraham Lincoln in many 
respects. Obviously, there was only one Lincoln, and Robert Jackson did not lead the Union victoriously 
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Court Justice but, two years after Barnette, a leading world figure as the chief 
U.S. prosecutor of Nazi war criminals at Nuremberg. That made Jackson a 
leader of the process that held top Nazis legally accountable for their crimes, 
produced the record that is the basis for history’s understanding of what 
Hitler’s Third Reich was and did, including the Holocaust, and built modern 
international criminal and humanitarian law.  
Robert Jackson ended up in those high places. He began, late in the 19th 
century, on a family farm in Spring Creek Township in Warren County, in 
the northwest corner of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. His great-
grandfather settled there around 1800. He built a cabin, cleared land, and 
started to farm. And he had a son, who had a son, who fathered Robert H. 
Jackson. (Women also were involved.) 
Jackson had a rural, outdoors, hard-working, autonomous upbringing. 
His parents were farm people, but Jackson’s father inclined toward the 20th 
century, and so around 1898 the family moved into New York State to a 
village called Frewsburg. Jackson’s father pursued ventures: he logged and 
marketed wood; he bought, sold, and raced horses; he ran Frewsburg’s “Hotel 
Jackson” until it burned to the ground; he had a livery stable. He also drank, 
and he did not live a very long life, but perhaps he gave his son his 
autonomous, entrepreneurial spirit. 
Robert Jackson attended the Frewsburg school. He received knowledge 
and training, including in civic values, in a small public school that was very 
much like the ones that the Gobitas children and the Barnett sisters—
Jehovah’s Witnesses whose surnames, misspelled, would become part of 
U.S. constitutional law—attended in the same general region. 
Jackson, age seventeen, was Frewsburg High School’s valedictorian in 
1909. During the next year, he commuted by rail up the valley to Jamestown, 
New York, a much bigger city, where he took a second senior year at its high 
school. And that was the end of his general higher education—he never 
attended a day of college. Instead, at age 18, he became the apprentice in a 
two-man Jamestown law firm. One was a trial lawyer. The other handled 
appeals. One was a talker and a politico, the other a writer and a scholar. Each 
poured his talent and style into Jackson. After a year, Jackson crossed the 
state and took the second of a two-year curriculum at Albany Law School. 
Then he returned to Jamestown and resumed his apprenticeship until he was 
21 and could take the New York State bar examination. 
Jackson began to practice in Jamestown and its region. Trying cases in 
Chautauqua County court, he impressed a visiting judge from Buffalo. He 
soon connected Jackson to his former law firm there. 
 
through a Civil War which resulted in the abolition of slavery. But I am speaking now not of historical 
accomplishments but of character traits.”). 
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Jackson, and his new wife, then moved to Buffalo. He went to work in 
the massive Ellicott Square building. He did high volume trial and appellate 
work, mostly in state court, for the firm’s main client, the streetcar company. 
He experienced “Big Law” circa 1917, and he became acquainted with bar 
leaders and rising legal stars, including John Lord O’Brian and William J. 
Donovan. Jackson, ambitious, figured out that it might take decades to 
become a leading legal figure in such a big city. 
So, in 1918, he returned to Jamestown. He built his law practice there, 
became very active in bar associations, and through that became a legal 
profession “player” in New York State and then nationally. He prospered, 
becoming the father of two children, building a big house with white pillars, 
owning an 80-acre horse farm, and keeping a cabin cruiser on Chautauqua 
Lake. The Great Depression did not affect him much because his clients were 
practical businesses that kept selling, and thus paid his bills. 
We might never have heard of Robert H. Jackson, or at least we would 
not be discussing him here, if he had stayed and become great only in New 
York State—history would remember him, probably, as an eloquent judge of 
the New York Court of Appeals, a position that Jackson came somewhat 
close to attaining in the 1930s, but not as a national figure, much less as 
someone who became significant on the international stage.  
But Jackson also had, in addition to his legal skills and prosperity across 
two decades in private law practice, an interest in politics. From his 
upbringing through about 1921, he inherited and was involved with the 
Andrew (no relation) Jacksonian Democratic Party politics of his father and 
grandfather. In 1911, one of Robert Jackson’s attorney-mentors introduced 
him, on a trip to Albany, to the new State Senator from Dutchess County, 
Frank Roosevelt. He was about 28 and Robert Jackson was about 18. Less 
than twenty years later, that Roosevelt had become F.D.R., and Jackson was 
connected to Roosevelt as governor, as presidential candidate, and then in the 
White House. 
As President, Franklin Roosevelt nominated Robert H. Jackson, and the 
Senate then confirmed those nominations, to five different offices: in 1934, 
to be Assistant General Counsel in the Treasury Department’s Bureau of 
Internal Revenue; in 1936, to be Assistant Attorney General, first heading the 
Tax Division in the Department of Justice and then DOJ’s Antitrust Division; 
in 1938, to be Solicitor General of the U.S., where he became a renowned 
Supreme Court advocate; in 1940, to be Attorney General of the U.S.; and in 
1941, to become an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. 
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II. BARNETTE IN ITS SUPREME COURT CONTEXT: THE 
JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES CASES, 1938–1943 
I turn now to the Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia State Board 
of Education v. Barnette, announced in June 1943. Although the Barnette 
decision stands on its own, in its published words, it also was one of 
numerous decisions that the Court handed down during a five-year period 
regarding the constitutional rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses.4 
This section locates Barnette within that range of decisions. I first 
describe the Court’s Jehovah’s Witnesses decisions as they came down, in 
three discernable phases. I then describe chronologically how the Court’s 
membership changed significantly as it was handling and deciding these 
cases. 
A. The General Pattern of the Decisions: The Court Warming to 
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ Constitutional Claims 
During 1940–43, the Supreme Court decided Jehovah’s Witnesses cases 
in three distinct time periods. For the most part, the Court at first rejected the 
Witnesses’ constitutional claims. Then it came to uphold them. Then it 
upheld them by more than a bare majority vote. 
1. The Pre-July 1941 Court 
The “first Court,” the pre-Summer 1941 Court on which Robert Jackson 
was not yet a member, generally handed down decisions rejecting 
constitutional claims by Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
Yes, the Witnesses did not lose every time one of their cases made it to 
the Supreme Court in these years. In 1938, for example, in Lovell v. City of 
Griffin, the Court unanimously reversed a Witness’s conviction for violating 
a city ordinance that prohibited unlicensed distribution of literature and 
required would-be distributors to get the city manager’s permission to do so.5 
In 1939, in Schneider v. New Jersey, the Court reversed three Witnesses’ 
criminal convictions for violating ordinances barring handbill distribution on 
 
4 See generally SHAWN FRANCIS PETERS, JUDGING JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: RELIGIOUS 
PERSECUTION & THE DAWN OF THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2000). 
5 303 U.S. 444 (1938). Earlier in the same term as Lovell, the Court had dismissed a Jehovah’s 
Witness’s appeal that arose from a criminal prosecution, also in Griffin, Georgia. See Coleman v. City of 
Griffin, 302 U.S. 636 (1937) (per curiam). It appears that Coleman is the first Supreme Court decision, 
albeit a summary one, in a Jehovah’s Witness case. See DAVID R. MANWARING, RENDER UNTO CAESAR: 
THE FLAG-SALUTE CONTROVERSY 27 (1962). 
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public streets or door-to-door.6 And in May 1940, the Court in Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, reversed criminal convictions of three Witnesses who had been 
convicted for selling religious books without purchasing a government 
license.7 
But the Cantwell Court was the same one that, just a month later, in 
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, held that the Constitution permitted a 
public school to expel Jehovah’s Witness schoolchildren who refused to 
salute the American flag.8 
And this was nearly the same Court—Justice James C. McReynolds did 
retire in the interim—that, in March 1941, nine months after Gobitis, upheld 
in Cox v. New Hampshire, the criminal convictions of 68 Jehovah’s 
Witnesses for violating a state law barring unlicensed parades on public 
streets.9 
During this period, Robert Jackson was Solicitor General and then 
Attorney General of the United States, not a Supreme Court Justice. I am 
aware of no evidence showing his reaction to Lovell, Schneider, Cantwell, or 
Cox. When Gobitis was decided in June 1940, however, Attorney General 
Jackson did disapprove, strongly, of its result, at least on the pragmatic 
ground that it was increasing public unrest. Jackson in this time period 
debated world security issues, and maybe even the Gobitis case, with his 
friend Justice Felix Frankfurter—on June 1, at a small, private dinner that 
Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish hosted at his Georgetown home,10 
Jackson and Justice Frankfurter debated past midnight, and with “a good deal 
of feeling,” the situation in Europe,11 and maybe related topics. Only two 
days later, on Monday, June 3, Justice Frankfurter announced his opinion for 
the Court in Gobitis. And on Friday, June 14, which happened to be Flag 
Day, the presidentially proclaimed day to commemorate the Continental 
Congress adopting on June 14, 1777, the Stars and Stripes as the official flag 
of the U.S.,12 Attorney General Jackson told President Roosevelt and the 
 
6 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
7 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
8 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
9 312 U.S. 569 (1941). One of the appellants in Cox was Walter Chaplinsky, soon to be subject of 
the Court’s decision in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, upholding his criminal conviction for insulting a 
police officer. 
10 See Letter from Robert H. Jackson to Archibald MacLeish, May 9, 1940 (original) (accepting 
his invitation to this dinner), in Archibald MacLeish Papers, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, 
Washington, D.C., Box 3.  
11 See HAROLD L. ICKES, III THE SECRET DIARY OF HAROLD L. ICKES: THE LOWERING CLOUDS, 
1939-1941, at 198, 199 (1955) (diary notes concerning this dinner). 
12 In 1916, President Wilson proclaimed the first Flag Day. Since then, every president has done 
so annually. See, e.g., President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Proclamation No. 2586, 3 C.F.R. § 38-43 (1943). 
In 1998, a law was enacted designating June 14 as Flag Day and asking the president each year to issue a 
Flag Day proclamation. See 36 U.S.C.A. § 110 (West 1998). 
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Cabinet of anti-alien, anti-”fifth columnist” hysteria that was sweeping the 
country and expressed his particular bitterness about the Gobitis decision.13 
2. The July 1941–May 1943 Court 
The “second Court,” which was the one that Jackson joined in July 1941, 
evolved into a pro-Jehovah’s Witness Court. 
Yes, the Witnesses at first continued to lose major cases before this 
Court. In March 1942, in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court upheld, 
unanimously, the criminal conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness street preacher 
for speaking offensive, derisive, and annoying words.14 Walter Chaplinsky 
had called a police officer “a God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist,” 
and the Court held that such “fighting words” were not protected speech 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.15 
And in Jones v. City of Opelika and its companion cases, decided in June 
1942, this Court held that the Constitution permitted the city to require 
Jehovah’s Witnesses to purchase licenses before they could distribute and 
sometimes sell religious books, pamphlets, and other publications—this did 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections of speech, press, and 
religious freedoms.16 
But in a short period of time, this Court swung around. At first, more 
Justices started to vote to uphold Jehovah’s Witnesses’ claims to 
constitutional protection—while Gobitis in 1940 had been an 8-1 decision 
against the Witnesses, Jones two years later was a much-closer 5-4 defeat for 
the Witnesses. Three Justices—Hugo L. Black, William O. Douglas, and 
Frank Murphy—not only began in Jones to vote in favor of Witnesses’ 
constitutional claims. These Justices, who had been part of the Gobitis super-
majority, filed in Jones, gratuitously, an opinion recanting their votes to 
uphold the flag salute.17 
Then, in 1943, this Court began to decide cases consistently in favor of 
the Witnesses’ claims to constitutional protection. In Murdock v. 
Pennsylvania (City of Jeanette) and Martin v. City of Struthers, decided in 
May 1943, the Court recognized, respectively, the Witnesses’ rights to 
distribute books and pamphlets door-to-door without having to pay for a 
 
13 See id. at 211 (diary notes concerning President Roosevelt’s June 14, 1940, Cabinet meeting). 
14 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
15 See id. at 573. 
16 See 316 U.S. 584 (1942). The companion cases were No. 280, Bowden v. Fort Smith, and No. 
966, Jobin v. Arizona. 
17 See id. at 623–24 (opinion of Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ.) 
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license, and to distribute, door-to-door, handbills containing religious 
information.18 
This Court also reconsidered Jones and its companion cases and decided 
them the other way. The Court held that, in light of Murdock, it was 
unconstitutional to enforce licensing ordinances against Witnesses who were 
distributing or selling literature door-to-door.19 
On this Court, Justice Jackson was a vote against the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. In 1942, he was part of the 5-4 majority in the initial Jones v. City 
of Opelika decision—Jones I. And in 1943, when a majority of the Court 
shifted in Murdock and Martin from Gobitis-decision-type hostility toward 
Jehovah’s Witnesses to support for their constitutional claims, Jackson was 
a dissenter . . . 
3. The June 1943 Court 
. . . except in the case of West Virginia State Board of Education v. 
Barnette. 
For purposes of this typology, the “third Court” was the Court that 
decided Barnette. Barnette was its own category because, while the Court 
majority there continued the pro-Jehovah’s Witnesses voting pattern of the 
1942–43 term’s other Witness case decisions, this one was made by more 
than a bare majority. Five Justices became six. The addition was the Justice 
who Chief Justice Stone Harlan Fiske Stone assigned to write the Court’s 
opinion: Robert H. Jackson. 
B. Some Particulars of Supreme Court Personnel, Cases, and 
Decisions, From Gobitis (1940) to Barnette (1943) 
As just outlined, the chronology of the Supreme Court deciding 
Jehovah’s Witnesses cases that are direct preludes to Barnette began in June 
1940 when the Court announced its Gobitis decision. 
In Gobitis, the Court declared that it was constitutional for a public 
school to expel Jehovah’s Witness schoolchildren who refused to salute the 
American flag.20 The vote was 8-1. Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote the 
Court’s opinion. He was joined by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and 
 
18 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania (City of Jeanette), 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Martin v. City of 
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). In a third case, Douglas v. City of Jeannette, that the Court heard and then 
decided at the same as Murdock and Martin, the Court held unanimously that it lacked jurisdiction to 
decide the appeal. See 319 U.S. 157 (1943). 
19 See Jones v. City of Opelika (Jones II), 319 U.S. 103 (1943). 
20 Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940). 
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Associate Justices James C. McReynolds, Owen J. Roberts, Hugo L. Black, 
Stanley Reed, William O. Douglas, and Frank Murphy. Then-Associate 
Justice Harlan Fiske Stone dissented alone. 
Less than a year later, the Court’s membership changed significantly. In 
January 1941, Justice McReynolds retired. That June, at the end of the 
Court’s term, Chief Justice Hughes also retired. President Roosevelt then 
“elevated” Justice Stone—the lone dissenter in Gobitis—to be the new Chief 
Justice, and Roosevelt appointed Senator James F. Byrnes (D.-SC) to succeed 
McReynolds and Attorney General Robert H. Jackson to succeed Stone as an 
Associate Justice. 
In the Court’s next term, the new Stone Court continued, at first, to 
decide Jehovah’s Witnesses cases as the Hughes Court had decided Gobitis, 
rejecting Witnesses’ claims to constitutional protection against government 
regulation. 
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court defined a Witness 
preacher’s street speech as unprotected “fighting words.”21 
In Jones v. City of Opelika,22 from Alabama, together with companion 
cases from Arkansas and Arizona, the Court upheld, by a narrow 5-4 vote, 
the constitutionality of Witnesses’ criminal convictions for selling printed 
matter without purchasing city-required licenses. In Jones—which in short 
time came to be known as Jones I—Justice Reed wrote the Court’s opinion.23 
He was joined by Justices Roberts and Frankfurter from the Gobitis majority 
of two years earlier, and by the two new Justices, Byrnes and Jackson. But 
Chief Justice Stone, still dissenting as he had, as an Associate Justice, in 
Gobitis, was no longer alone—in this case, Stone was joined by Justices 
Black, Douglas, and Murphy, who had cast anti-Jehovah’s Witnesses votes 
in Gobitis.24 And in a separate opinion, those three Justices now explicitly 
recanted their Gobitis votes to uphold the constitutionality of the flag salute.25 
The 8-1 Gobitis Court thus had become a bare majority of 5-4. 
Following this decision, during the Court’s 1942 summer recess, the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses who were the losing parties in the Jones case filed 
petitions seeking rehearing. They were supported by amici, including the 
American Newspaper Publishers Association and the American Civil 
Liberties Union, who urged the Court to recognize that Jehovah’s Witnesses’ 
constitutional rights were violated by government enforcement of both 
 
21 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
22 316 U.S. 584 (1942). 
23 See id. at 584–600. 
24 See id. at 600–11 (opinion of Stone, C.J., joined by Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ.); see also 
id. at 611–23 (Murphy, J., joined by Black and Douglas, JJ., dissenting). 
25 See id. at 623–24 (opinion of Black, Douglas, and Murphy, JJ.). 
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licensing requirements on leafletting and by compelling schoolchildren to 
salute the flag.26 
On October 5, 1942, as the new Supreme Court term began, Justice 
Byrnes resigned—he concluded his Court career after only one term. That 
departure led, before the term was out, to the demise of the Jones decision 
and to other Jehovah’s Witnesses’ victories in the Court, including in 
Barnette. 
A major legal development occurred in West Virginia on the day 
following Byrnes’s retirement: the U.S. Supreme Court was effectively 
overruled by an inferior court, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of West Virginia.27 Two young public school students, Gathie and 
Marie Barnett, had refused to salute and pledge allegiance to the American 
flag as the state board of education required, because doing so would have 
violated their beliefs as Jehovah’s Witnesses.28 Their school repeatedly sent 
them home for their noncompliance and eventually it expelled them. Other 
schools did the same to other children who were Witnesses and refusing to 
salute the flag. 
The Barnett girls’ father and two other adult plaintiffs filed a federal 
class action lawsuit. They argued that the State policy violated the U.S. 
Constitution and they sought an injunction. And in the District Court, the 
three-judge panel held that Gobitis was no longer good law, because three of 
the eight Justices who had been part of the Gobitis Court had recanted their 
votes and a fourth had resigned.29 On the merits, the panel issued the 
injunction. It held that the compulsory flag salute denied the plaintiffs’ 
fundamental rights of religious liberty.30 
The West Virginia State Board of Education appealed this judgment to 
the Supreme Court. On January 4, 1943, the Court—only eight Justices, 
following Justice Byrnes’s resignation—noted its probable jurisdiction.31 
A few days later, on January 11, 1943, the country learned who the new 
ninth Justice would be. President Roosevelt nominated Justice Wiley 
Rutledge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to become 
an Associate Justice. The Senate confirmed the nomination swiftly and 
Justice Rutledge received his commission on February 11, 1943. 
 
26 See Publishers Urge Court Reversal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1942, at 21. 
27 See Barnette v. West Virginia State Board of Education, 47 F. Supp. 251 (S.D.W.V. 1942). 
28 See generally Gregory L. Peterson, E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Shawn Francis Peters, Bennett 
Boskey, Gathie Barnett Edmonds, Marie Barnett Snodgrass, & John Q. Barrett, Recollections of West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 81 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 755 (2007) [hereinafter 
Recollections of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette]. 
29 See Barnette, 47 F. Supp. at 252–53. 
30 Id. at 255. 
31 See 63 S. Ct. 437 (1943); accord 1942 J. Sup. Ct. U.S. 110, 112 (1943). 
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On the very next day, Friday, February 12, the Court began to hear oral 
arguments in the first of that term’s many cases involving Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. It was still an eight-Justice Court that heard argument that day 
because Justice Rutledge, although commissioned, did not take his seat until 
the following Monday, February 15.32 
The February 12 argument cases, Jamison v. Texas and Largent v. 
Texas, arose from arrests and prosecutions of Jehovah’s Witnesses for 
leafletting and selling books door-to-door without the requisite licenses. The 
Court decided these cases three weeks later, 8-0, with Justice Rutledge not 
participating. In Jamison, the Court held that Fourteenth Amendment press 
and free exercise rights applied to Jehovah’s Witnesses distributing handbills 
on the streets even if the handbills contained some commercial information.33 
In Largent, the Court held that the Jehovah’s Witnesses had a Fourteenth 
Amendment right to sell books in the residential areas of Paris, Texas, 
without getting from the mayor the permit which he had unrestricted 
discretion to issue or withhold.34 
On Monday, February 15, Justice Rutledge was present for the first time 
on the Supreme Court bench. He thus was part of the Court that on that day, 
back at full strength, granted the petition for rehearing in Jones and its 
companion cases35—soon leading to the decision known as Jones II.  
March 1943 was an even more significant month. On March 10 and 11, 
the Court heard oral arguments in a raft of Jehovah’s Witnesses cases. In the 
first, the high-profile re-argument of Jones, Jehovah’s Witnesses’ attorney 
Hayden Covington argued unopposed—the City of Opelika did not, unlike 
its approach in 1942 when the case first was argued (and it had won), send 
an attorney to argue its side. Perhaps it knew that it was in trouble. 
The Court also heard oral arguments that day in four other Jehovah’s 
Witnesses cases: (1) Murdock v. Pennsylvania, arising from the city of 
Jeannette, Pennsylvania; (2) Martin v. Struthers, arising from the city of 
Struthers, Ohio; (3) Douglas v. City of Jeannette (also from Jeanette, 
Pennsylvania); and (4) West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. 
The Barnette case was, in other words, not a stand-alone event in the Supreme 
Court. 
On Saturday, March 13, the Justices met in conference to discuss and 
decide these just-argued cases. In the main, they voted 5-4 in favor of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses. In Jones II, for example, Chief Justice Stone plus 
 
32 1942 J. Sup. Ct. U.S. 153 (1943). Cf. JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF 
THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY RUTLEDGE 221 (2004) (quoting the letter that Justice Rutledge 
wrote from the Court to President Roosevelt on February 15, 1943). 
33 318 U.S. 413 (1943). 
34 318 U.S. 418 (1943). 
35 See Jones v. City of Opelika, 318 U.S. 797 (1943). 
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Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge voted for the Witnesses, the 
opposite of what the Court had decided in Jones I the previous June. In 
Murdock and Martin, the same Justices voted in favor of the Witnesses. In 
Douglas, the Justices concluded they lacked jurisdiction. And in Barnette, 
the vote was 6-3 in the Witnesses’ favor. This was the only case in which 
Justice Jackson voted with the five “liberals”—he voted opposite them in 
Jones II, Murdock, and Martin, and he joined them to overrule Gobitis. 
Following the conference voting, Chief Justice Stone assigned Justice 
Jackson to draft the opinion of the six-Justice Court in Barnette. Stone might 
well have, with the assigning power of his position plus his history of having 
been the lone dissenter in Gobitis, kept that assignment for himself. His 
assignment, instead, to Jackson suggests the closeness of their relationship, 
and perhaps a logical distribution of Court workload. It also indicates the 
possible “softness” of Jackson’s vote in Barnette—he was, by voting pattern, 
the least pro-Jehovah’s Witness member of the six-Justice Barnette majority, 
so having him write the Court’s opinion upholding the Witnesses’ 
constitutional argument would mean, by definition, that he would be 
comfortable with it. Bennett Boskey, Chief Justice Stone’s senior law clerk 
at the time, recalled all of this vividly more than sixty years later: 
Stone, having written the Gobitis case, would have been 
overjoyed to be the author of the opinion in 
the Barnette case. But he had better sense than that. He knew 
that he had a new Justice in Jackson. He knew that if 
Rutledge was given the opinion, he would write probably too 
wide an opinion to hold the six votes together. [Stone] had 
no hope that if Black, Douglas, or Murphy wrote the opinion, 
it would be sufficiently, narrowly constructed to hold the six 
votes together—it might lose Jackson. So we talked about it 
some and [Stone] decided the best thing to do for the Court 
to get an opinion which would be subscribed to by the 
maximum number of Justices, which in this case would be 
six, would be to assign the opinion to Jackson, whatever 
chances that might involve taking. And that’s what he did. 
And that’s how Jackson, who was a relatively junior Justice, 
ended up as the author of this terribly important opinion.36 
In April, while the Justices were drafting and circulating proposed 
opinions in these cases, the Court heard oral arguments in an additional 
cluster of Jehovah’s Witnesses cases. On April 15 and 16, the Court heard 
argument in Taylor v. Mississippi, Benoit v. Mississippi, and Cummings v. 
 
36 Recollections of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, supra note 28, at 784 
(quoting Bennett Boskey). 
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Mississippi.37 In the cases, the appellants claimed that their criminal 
convictions for promoting refusal to salute the American flag violated the 
Constitution. They argued, in other words, that they had constitutional rights 
to teach and encourage refusal to salute the American flag—the substantive 
issue that was pending in Barnette. 
In May, the Court announced decisions in four of the pending cases. 
First was its reconsideration of its decision of the previous June, Jones v. City 
of Opelika. This time, in Jones II, the Court held 5-4 that the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses had First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to leaflet without 
obtaining municipal licenses.38 Justice Douglas read the Court’s brief per 
curiam opinion, for himself, Chief Justice Stone, and Justices Black, Murphy, 
and Rutledge.39 Justices Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented. 
The switch of Justice Rutledge for Justice Byrnes had flipped the Jones case. 
Chief Justice Stone—or perhaps his law clerk Bennett Boskey, if he 
initially drafted that per curiam opinion—had been prepared, at least at first, 
to say explicitly that the Court’s personnel change had caused the change in 
result from Jones I to Jones II. Stone had, back on March 25, circulated to 
the other Justices a proposed Jones II per curiam opinion stating that “the 
Court as now constituted is of opinion that the judgment in each case [i.e., in 
Jones and its companion cases, and in Murdock and its companion cases] 
should be reversed.”40 The candid words “as now constituted” startled Justice 
Roberts (and maybe others). Roberts discussed his concerns with Justice 
Douglas, who then reported them to the Chief Justice, who “readily agreed” 
to delete those words.41 In the brief Jones II opinion that the Court handed 
down on May 3, it rested its decision to reverse the Witnesses’ criminal 
convictions on only its concurrent decision in Murdock, and on the dissenting 
opinions that had been filed a year earlier in Jones I.42 It was nonetheless true, 
if not stated explicitly, that the four Jones I dissenters now had, with Justice 
Rutledge, the fifth vote that made the case come out the other way. 
Justice Douglas, following his announcement of Jones II, then 
announced his opinion for the Court in the Murdock case from Jeannette, 
 
37 See 1942 J. Sup. Ct. U.S. 212–13 (1943); Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583, 584–85 (1943). 
38 319 U.S. 103, 104 (1943). 
39 See 1942 J. Sup. Ct. U.S. 222 (1943). 
40 See Printed and circulated opinion, No. 280, Jones v. City of Opelika, No. 314, Bowden & 
Sanders v. City of Fort Smith, and No. 966, Jobin v. Arizona, Mar. 25, 1943 (Justice Jackson’s copy, 
received from Chief Justice Stone) (emphasis added), in Robert H. Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, 
Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., (“RHJL”), Box 127, Folder 1. 
41 See Note from “WOD” [Justice Douglas] to “OJR” [Justice Roberts], “3/26” [Mar. 26, 1943] 
(“I called the CJ about the suggested change in the per curiam in Jones v. Opelika. He readily agreed to 
it[.]”), in WOD LOC, Box 89, Folder 9. Roberts wrote “Thanks!! OJR” on this note and sent it back to 
Douglas. Id. 
42 See Jones II, 319 U.S. at 104. 
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Pennsylvania. The Court invalidated license requirements for selling books 
and religious literature on public streets.43 The Justices again divided 5-4—
Stone, Black, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge voted for the Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, and Roberts, Reed, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented.  
One other decision that the Court announced on May 3 was a big victory 
for the Jehovah’s Witnesses. In Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court—the 
same majority of five Justices—invalidated an ordinance outlawing door-to-
door knocking and proselytizing throughout Struthers, Ohio.44 
The Court’s final Jehovah’s Witness decision announced that day is the 
one that you likely do not know: Douglas v. City of Jeannette. The Court held 
9-0 that federal courts lacked equitable power to enjoin future state 
enforcement of speaker licensing laws, such as those that the Court had, just 
minutes earlier, held unconstitutional in Jones II. The Court held in Douglas 
that because the danger of such enforcement was too speculative, the Court 
in effect should abstain from deciding its constitutionality.45 
With regard to Justice Jackson and Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Douglas 
decision might be the most interesting. Jackson’s “big” 1942 term opinion 
regarding Jehovah’s Witnesses arguably is Barnette, the 75th anniversary of 
which brings us together. But that mantle also, arguably, fits the opinion that 
he filed in Douglas.46 
This Jackson opinion is literally hard to find. Its location in the reported 
Douglas decision is topically incongruous, because Jackson’s opinion has 
nothing to do with the Douglas case. In this respect, Jackson filing in Douglas 
his very significant non-Douglas thoughts was a bit like Justices Black, 
Douglas, and Murphy having filed in Jones I their recantation of their votes 
in Gobitis—it had nothing to do with the issues of Jones II, except at the very 
macro level of both cases involving Jehovah’s Witnesses. Yes, Jackson’s 
opinion in Douglas noted his concurrence in that 9-0 result, that the Court 
lacked jurisdiction. But much more importantly, the opinion was, as its odd 
and complicated opening author and case identification states,47 his 
substantive dissent in Murdock and in Martin, the 5-4 decisions of that day 
which declared the constitutional rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses to sell books 
and to preach door-to-door. 
Jackson announced his Douglas “dissenting” opinion, really his 
dissenting opinion in Murdock and Martin, six weeks before he announced 
 
43 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
44 319 U.S. 141 (1943). 
45 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). 
46 See 319 U.S. at 166–82 (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result & 
dissenting in Murdock v. Pennsylvania and Martin v. City of Struthers). 
47 See id. at 166 (“Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in the result in this case and dissenting in Nos. 
480-487, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, ante, p. 105, and No. 238, Martin v. Struthers, ante, p. 141.”). 
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his opinion for the Court in Barnette. The reason for that gap in time was 
simple: the Justices had finished writing their Murdock, Martin, and Douglas 
opinions while they were still working on their draft opinions in Barnette. 
The gap between the decision announcements meant that Douglas, decided 
first, got noticed in its moment, and that it soon was overshadowed, and in 
the decades since then it has been overshadowed, by the later decision, which 
is to say Barnette. 
During the time gap between the Murdock, Martin, and Douglas 
decisions on May 3 and Barnette on June 14, the Court heard oral arguments 
in Busey v. District of Columbia, another Jehovah’s Witness case. At issue 
was the constitutionality of a D.C. code provision requiring magazine-sellers 
such as Jehovah’s Witnesses to procure a government license and pay a 
license tax. This law was the federal equivalent of the Alabama law that the 
Court had considered in Jones v. City of Opelika. In Busey, the lower court, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, had in April 1942 
upheld, based on Jones I, the federal law’s constitutionality.48 Justice Wiley 
Rutledge, then serving on the Court of Appeals, dissented from the Busey 
panel’s 2-1 decision. By June 1, 1943, when Busey was argued in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, Rutledge had become an Associate Justice there, so he 
recused himself—the case was argued to an eight-Justice Court. And because 
the Court by that time had reheard Jones v. Opelika and held in Jones II that 
the Alabama law was unconstitutional, it seemed clear that the federal law’s 
days were numbered as well. 
And then came Monday, June 14. In the Court’s session that day, Justice 
Jackson announced the decision in West Virginia State Board of Education 
v. Barnette.49 The Court, by a 6-3 vote, reversed its Gobitis decision 
upholding the constitutionality of the school-required American flag salute 
and Pledge of Allegiance. Jehovah’s Witness schoolchildren, Supreme Court 
losers three years earlier, now were paragons of following conscience as 
protected by the U.S. Constitution, even as they refused to join in national 
rituals of patriotism and unity. Jackson still felt what he had voiced in 
President Roosevelt’s Cabinet three years earlier, to the date: flag salute 
policies that divide people and cause majority hysteria and violence against 
Jehovah’s Witnesses should not be enforced. In that wartime moment, 
Jackson abjured the idea that governments in the U.S. could compel Nazi-
resembling salutes.50 He explained that the case concerned “the asserted 
[government] power to force an American citizen publicly to profess any 
 
48 Busey v. District of Columbia, 129 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1942). 
49 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
50 See id. at 627–28. 
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statement of belief, or to engage in any ceremony of assent to one . . . ”51 He 
declared that the Constitution grants no such power: 
[i]f there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, 
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall 
be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other 
matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or 
act their faith therein.52 
In the United States, the date on which the Supreme Court announced 
Barnette, June 14, 1943, also was “Flag Day.”53 But it seems that the timing 
of the Court announcing Barnette on Flag Day was nothing that the Justices 
did deliberately or even noticed. To my knowledge, no evidence, including 
in any Justice’s archived papers, suggests that the Court timed its 
announcement of Barnette to occur on Flag Day, to explain extra-powerfully, 
with the holiday as the decision’s backdrop (and then, going forward, its 
anniversary), the unconstitutionality of government compelling persons to 
salute and to pledge allegiance to the American flag. It seems that the 
decision came down on that day simply because it was the next Supreme 
Court “decision day” that followed Justice Frankfurter completing, on 
Friday, June 11, 1943, his dissenting opinion in Barnette.54 
One indication that Justice Jackson in particular was oblivious to the 
symbolism of deciding Barnette on Flag Day is a note that he penned to his 
law clerk, John Costelloe. On Saturday morning, June 12, 1943, Jackson 
asked Costelloe to review a couple of paragraphs that Jackson, after receiving 
and reading Justice Frankfurter’s draft dissent, had drafted as additions to his 
opinion for the Barnette Court. Jackson wrote: 
  
 
51 Id. at 634. 
52 Id. at 642. 
53 See supra note 12. 
54 See Typed Diary entries of Felix Frankfurter, June 10, 1943 (“Worked until 2:00 a.m. on Flag 
Salute case.”), and June 11, 1943 (“Work on Flag Salute case.”), in Felix Frankfurter Papers, Library of 
Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., Box 2. He provided his proposed opinion to his fellow 
Justices the next morning, before they met together in Conference and discussed the case for a final time. 
See Pencil note, no author identified [it was Jackson’s secretary Ruth M. Sternberg], no date (“Diss. Opn 
of F.F. rec’d 6-12-43 am”), in RHJL Box 127, Folder 10. 
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Johnny - 
Here are two inserts I 
plan to put in [No.] 591[, Barnette]. 
Look them over and I 
will drop in [your room to talk] at lunch. 
This stuff goes 
Monday. 
RHJ55 
Note Jackson’s workman-like use of “Monday”—June 14 was the next 
decision day, so it would be the day to get this decision out the door. 
On that day, the Court announced, in addition to Barnette, two other 
decisions in Jehovah’s Witnesses cases. In Taylor v. Mississippi and its two 
companion cases, the Court, in an opinion written by Justice Roberts, held 
unanimously that the Constitution bars a State from punishing persons who 
advise and urge others not to salute the flag.56 In other words, given every 
person’s constitutional right, explained by Justice Jackson for the Court 
moments earlier in Barnette, to refuse to obey State compulsion to salute the 
American flag, a State may not punish someone for teaching and urging 
exercise of that Barnette right.57 And in Busey v. District of Columbia, the 
case regarding the constitutionality of the federal requirement that would-be 
magazine-sellers must purchase licenses, the Court decided 8-0, per curiam, 
to vacate the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ criminal convictions and remand the cases 
for reexamination in light of Jones II and Murdock.58 
On June 21, 1943, the Supreme Court recessed for the summer. It had, 
in the just-completed term, heard arguments and announced decisions in 
three distinct, important groups of cases involving the rights of Jehovah’s 
Witnesses. In nine decisions—a pair, Largent and Jamison, on March 8; four 
more, Jones II, Murdock, Martin, and Douglas, on May 3; and a final trio, 
Barnette, Taylor, and Busey, on June 14—the Court upheld Witnesses’ 
claims that the Constitution protected their unlicensed selling of books for 
religious purposes (Largent), unlicensed distribution of handbills on public 
 
55 Note from Justice Robert H. Jackson to John F. Costelloe, no date [June 12, 1943], in RHJL 
Box 127, Folder 10.  
56 319 U.S. 583 (1943). 
57 See id. at 589 (“The statute here in question seeks to punish as criminal one who teaches 
resistance to government compulsion to salute [the American flag]. If the Fourteenth Amendment bans 
enforcement of the school regulation, a fortiori it prohibits the imposition of punishment for urging and 
advising that, on religious grounds, citizens refrain from saluting the flag. If the state cannot constrain one 
to violate his conscientious religious conviction by saluting the national emblem, then certainly it cannot 
punish him for imparting his views on the subject to his fellows and exhorting them to accept those 
views.”). 
58 See 319 U.S. 579 (1943) (per curiam). 
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streets (Jamison), unlicensed door-to-door sales of books for religious 
purposes (Jones II), unlicensed door-to-door sales of religious handbills 
(Murdock and Martin), refusals to salute the American flag or participate in 
the Pledge of Allegiance (Barnette), promoting refusal to salute the flag 
(Taylor), and unlicensed sale of magazines on public sidewalks (Busey). 
The Witnesses’ only non-victory was Douglas, where the Court found 
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider their claim. 
III. JUSTICE JACKSON ON JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES: THE AUTHOR 
OF BARNETTE WROTE FIRST, AND SIGNIFICANTLY, IN 
DOUGLAS 
The Justice Jackson who wrote for the Court in Barnette also was the 
Justice Jackson who wrote for himself, mostly dissenting, just six weeks 
earlier, in Douglas.59 His separate opinion in Douglas was an important, and 
maybe the central, part of his 1943 adjudication of Jehovah’s Witnesses’ 
constitutional claims. 
In Douglas, Justice Jackson dug deeply into the record regarding the 
conduct that led to the arrests, prosecutions, and convictions that the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses were challenging in Murdock and Martin. Jackson 
explained that, to him, the facts were very important to resolving the 
constitutional arguments.60 And so he recounted in detail, in more than eight 
pages in the United States Reports,61 exactly what the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
stood for and what they had done.  
I recount these facts here meaning no disrespect to Jehovah’s Witnesses 
today. They include my friend Marie Barnett Snodgrass, who as a child was 
a winning litigant in Barnette. In adulthood, she is a very kind and admirable 
person, as was her late sister Gathie Barnett Edmonds. 
In 1943, reviewing the record of Barnette, Justice Jackson plainly saw 
the Barnetts as impressive schoolchildren of conscience who were protected 
by the Constitution and deserving of judicial support. But, by contrast, he 
emphasized in his Douglas opinion that, based on Jehovah’s Witnesses’ 
literature and the factual records in the Murdock and Martin cases, he saw 
the adult Witnesses who had gotten arrested in Jeanette, Pennsylvania, in 
 
59 See Douglas, 319 U.S. at 166 (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result & 
dissenting in Murdock v. Pennsylvania and Martin v. City of Struthers). 
60 See id. at 166–67 (“The facts of record in the Douglas case and their relation to the facts of the 
other cases seem to me worth recital and consideration if we are realistically to weigh the conflicting 
claims of rights in the related cases today decided.”). See generally Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: 
Robert Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of the First Amendment, 75 TULANE L. REV. 251, 
273–75 (2000) (discussing Jackson’s Douglas dissent). 
61 See id. at 167–75. 
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April 1939 (the Murdock case defendants) and in Struthers, Ohio, in July 
1940 (the Martin case defendants) as unsought, invasive, annoying, 
bothersome, pestering proselytizers who had verbally assaulted persons in 
what should have been the repose of home life. 
Jackson highlighted the provocative, insulting content he found in 
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ literature. He quoted from John Franklin Rutherford, 
then the Witnesses’ leader, who was the author of material that they produced 
and distributed. In Rutherford’s book Enemies,62 he had written that: 
• “The greatest racket ever invented and practiced is that 
of religion.”; 
• “There are numerous systems of religion, but the most 
subtle, fraudulent and injurious to humankind is that 
which is generally labeled the ‘Christian religion,’ 
because it has the appearance of a worshipful devotion 
to the Supreme Being, and thereby easily misleads many 
honest and sincere persons.”; 
• The Roman Catholic hierarchy is “the great racket, a 
racket that is greater than all other rackets combined.”; 
• “Referring now to the foregoing Scriptural definition of 
harlot: What religious system exactly fits the prophecies 
recorded in God’s Word? There is but one answer, and 
that is, The Roman Catholic Church organization.”; 
• “Jewish and Protestant clergy and other allies of the 
[Roman Catholic Church] Hierarchy … tag along behind 
the Hierarchy at the present time to do the bidding of the 
old ‘whore’.”; and 
• “Says the prophet of Jehovah: ‘It shall come to pass in 
that day, that Tyre (modern Tyre, the Roman Catholic 
Hierarchy organization) shall be forgotten.’ Forgotten 
by whom? By her former illicit paramours who have 
committed fornication with her.” 
Jackson also quoted another Rutherford book, Religion.63 In it, he: 
• encouraged Witnesses to “set up their phonographs 
before the doors and windows and send the message of 
the kingdom right into the houses into the ears of those 
who might wish to hear; and while those desiring to hear 
are hearing, some of the ‘sourpusses’ are compelled to 
hear.”; 
 
62 See id. at 171 et seq. 
63 See id. at 172 et seq. 
10 - BARRETT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/9/19 6:03 PM 
846 FIU Law Review [Vol. 13:827 
• urged Witnesses to be like locusts: “Locusts invade the 
homes of the people and even eat the varnish off the 
wood and eat the wood to some extent. Likewise God’s 
faithful witnesses, likened unto locusts, get the kingdom 
message right into the house and they take the veneer off 
the religious things that are in that house, including 
candles and ‘holy water’, remove the superstition from 
the minds of the people, and show them that the 
doctrines that have been taught to them are wood, hay 
and stubble, destructible by fire, and they cannot 
withstand the heat.”; and 
• attacked Catholic Church teaching: “‘[P]urgatory’ is a 
bogeyman, set up by the agents of Satan to frighten the 
people into the religious organizations, where they may 
be fleeced of their hard-earned money.” 
Jackson also described the facts contained in the sparse record of the 
Murdock case. In Jeanette, Pennsylvania, on April 2 (Palm Sunday), 1939, 
over 100 Jehovah’s Witnesses rang doorbells or knocked on the doors of 
every home. The Witnesses stood in the doorways. Homeowners and tenants 
who answered were subjected to phonographic records blaring anti-religious 
messages, such as: 
• “Religion is wrong and a snare because it deceives the 
people”; and 
• “Religion is a racket because it has long been used and 
is still used to extract money from the people.”64 
In Martin, which concerned events in Struthers, Ohio, Jehovah’s 
Witnesses also had knocked on doors on a Sunday afternoon, July 7, 1940. 
Residents who tried to rebuff them were not respected. A mother who refused 
to take a Witness’s handbill into her home was told that she was “doomed to 
go to hell because [she] would not let this literature into [her] home for [her] 
children to read.”65 
To Justice Jackson, all of these words in their contexts were what the 
unanimous Court had, just one year earlier in Chaplinsky, another Jehovah’s 
Witness case, called “fighting words” that are not protected by the 
Constitution.66 Jackson, in this portion of his Douglas opinion, thought that 
 
64 Id. at 167. 
65 Id. at 173. 
66 See id. at 180 (“Neither can I think it is an essential part of freedom that religious differences 
be aired in language that is obscene, abusive, or inciting to retaliation. We have held that a Jehovah’s 
Witness may not call a public officer a ‘God damned racketeer’ and a ‘damned Fascist,’ because that is to 
use ‘fighting words,’ and such are not privileged.”) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 569 (1942)). 
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his five brethren in the majority had ignored facts that should have been 
decisive. 
Justice Jackson also considered, in addition to the facts of the Witnesses’ 
behavior, the facts of lives they had affected. Jackson wrote, in an 
interestingly self-exposing statement, that the Witnesses were able to come 
into direct contact with people who were not insulated by wealth and 
privilege. In a footnote, he quoted Harvard Law School Professor and free 
speech expert Zechariah Chafee, Jr., who had “wonder[ed] whether the 
Justices of the Supreme Court are quite aware of the effect of organized front-
door intrusions upon people who are not sheltered from zealots and imposters 
by a staff of servants or the locked entrance of an apartment house.”67  
When Jackson wrote that, he was living at his Hickory Hill home in 
rural, isolated McLean, Virginia. Most of his Court colleagues, by contrast, 
lived in Washington, D.C., homes or apartments where they did not answer 
their own doors and risk encountering proselytizers. But that was a fact of 
typical life in communities like Jeanette and Struthers. 
Jackson also reproduced, in his Douglas opinion footnotes, census data 
showing how many Roman Catholics lived in those communities, and how 
many people were factory laborers who worked night shifts and needed to 
sleep during the day.68 He used these facts to assess the real intrusiveness of 
hearing the doorbell or the knock, answering the door, and then hearing the 
hectoring words of proselytizers. 
Jackson thus announced in his Douglas opinion that he was dissenting 
in Murdock and Martin because the Court had not properly balanced the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ claims against the harms they had caused to persons in 
their homes and communities. He accused the Court of offering, casually, 
absolutist descriptions of rights that were not germane to what the cases really 
involved. He urged instead an approach that considered the force of the 
Jehovah’s Witnesses’ press, religious, and speech rights claims against their 
impacts on unwilling audiences: 
Our difference of opinion [with the Court] cannot fairly be 
given the color of a disagreement as to whether the 
constitutional rights of Jehovah’s Witnesses should be 
protected insofar as they are rights. These Witnesses, in 
common with all others, have extensive rights to proselyte 
and propagandize. These of course include the right to 
oppose and criticize the Roman Catholic Church or any other 
denomination. These rights are, and should be held to be, as 
 
67 Douglas, 319 U.S. at 175 n.3. (Jackson, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result & 
dissenting in Murdock v. Pennsylvania and Martin v. City of Struthers). 
68 See id. at 167 n.1. 
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extensive as any orderly society can tolerate in religious 
disputation. The real question is where their rights end and 
the rights of others begin. The real task of determining the 
extent of their rights on balance with the rights of others is 
not meant met by pronouncement of general propositions 
with which there is no disagreement. 
 
If we should strip these cases to the underlying questions, I 
find them too difficult as constitutional problems to be 
disposed of by a vague but fervent transcendentalism.69 
A final, notable dimension of Justice Jackson’s Douglas opinion was his 
focus on the limits of judicial power. In his view, the Court should exercise 
power pragmatically, carefully, and at the level of the questions that cases 
really concern. That is where judging will connect with existing or probable 
public consensus and support. That is where a Court can teach and be obeyed 
and, by those measures, succeed. And, concomitantly, the Court should not 
make too-abstract decisions that will put it too far from real connection to the 
people. 
Here is how Jackson explained his view: 
In these cases, local authorities caught between the offended 
householders and the drive of the Witnesses, have been hard 
put to keep the peace of their communities. They have 
invoked old ordinances that are crude and clumsy for the 
purpose. I should think the singular persistence of the 
turmoil about Jehovah’s Witnesses, one which seems to 
result from the work of no other sect, would suggest to this 
Court a thorough examination of their methods to see if they 
impinge unduly on the rights others. Instead of that the Court 
has, in one way after another, tied the hands of all local 
authority and made the aggressive methods of this group the 
law of the land. 
 
This Court is forever adding new stories to the temples of 
constitutional law, and the temples have a way of collapsing 
when one story too many is added.70 
Justice Jackson read his Douglas dissent from the bench on May 3, 
1943, immediately after Chief Justice Stone had read his opinion for the 
Court in that case.71 Earlier in that Court session, Justice Douglas had read 
 
69 319 U.S. at 178–79. 
70 Id. at 181. 
71 1942 J. Sup. Ct. U.S. 221, 223 (1943). 
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the Court’s per curiam opinion in Jones II,72 and then his opinion for the 
Court in Murdock,73 and Justice Black had read his opinion for the Court in 
Martin.74 Only then did Jackson, by reading his Douglas opinion explaining 
his dissenting votes in Murdock and Martin, let the majority “have it.” 
 Jackson’s fellow dissenters knew what was coming from him. While 
others, probably Chief Justice Stone, were reading their opinions for the 
Court, Justice Roberts passed a note to Jackson: “Give ‘em hell! I’m getting 
hotter + hotter!”75 And when Jackson was done reading, Roberts passed him 
a second note: “You gave ‘em hell! Please accept this acknowledgement of 
my obligation[.]”76 
If Jackson sent any notes back to Roberts, it seems that they have not 
survived. But Jackson also exchanged notes with Justice Frankfurter while 
they were on the bench, after Jackson had read his Douglas dissent, and these 
Frankfurter notes are preserved in Jackson’s papers. 
It seems that Jackson, after he finished reading, wrote to Frankfurter to 
explain his decision to do so. It seems that Jackson decided on the bench, as 
the day’s proceedings were occurring, to read his Douglas dissenting opinion 
rather than just to release it in print. Jackson explained that he had watched 
how closely the well-informed, thoughtful people who comprised the 
courtroom audience were listening to other Justices reading their pro-
Jehovah’s Witnesses opinions for the Court. This caused Jackson to decide 
to read his dissenting views to those listeners. 
Justice Frankfurter responded to Jackson’s explanation by penning a 
multi-page note of agreement. Frankfurter passed this note to Jackson, 
probably by handing it to a messenger for delivery rather than having the five 
Justices who sat on the bench between them pass it one to the next: 
I wholly agree with 
you, and [it was] precisely 
because my esti- 
mate of the audience 
was the same as 
yours that I 
deemed your full 
delivery so impor- 
tant. 
 
72 See id. at 222. 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 223. 
75 Note from “OJR” [Justice Owen J. Roberts], one sheet of Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum pad paper, in RHJL Box 127, Folder 6. 
76 Note from “OJR” [Justice Owen J. Roberts], one sheet of Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum pad paper, in RHJL Box 127, Folder 6. 
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By this time [in my judicial career] 
I can feel the 
emanations of 
an audience 
when it was 
as clear[,] deep 
and uniform as [what] 
I’d bet my 
right hand 
was the judgment 
of what you 
rightly call an 
informed + critically 
qualified body.77 
Jackson also must have written his concern that he had spoken too long. 
Frankfurter responded to this by penning a second, pun-filled note of 
disagreement and passing it to Jackson: 
As my God is 
my witness – 
it was not too 
long. Really, I 
would not, if I 
had been empowered, 
have omitted a 
single minute of your delivery. 
 FF 
P.S. 
Some things are 
important – 
+ these Jehovah 
cases were of that 
importance which 
called for “testifying.” 
FF78 
 
77 Note from “FF” [Justice Felix Frankfurter], four sheets of Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum pad paper, in RHJL Box 127, Folder 6. 
78 Note from “FF” [Justice Felix Frankfurter], two sheets of Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum pad paper (emphases in original), in RHJL Box 127, Folder 6. 
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IV. CONCLUSION: SOME LIFE ROOTS OF JUSTICE JACKSON’S 
VIEWS ON JEHOVAH’S WITNESSES AND OTHERS 
I will finish where I began, on a few biographical dimensions of Robert 
H. Jackson. These are ones that seem to connect to the votes he cast as a 
Supreme Court Justice and the opinions he wrote in the Jehovah’s Witnesses 
cases. 
Jackson knew of religious variety and small, non-conforming sects from 
western Pennsylvania and western New York State—his boyhood landscape 
was filled with iconoclastic, idiosyncratic practices and beliefs. Joseph Smith 
discovered the Mormon faith, and then encountered persecution and began 
his trek, in western New York. Spiritualist and transcendentalist movements 
flourished at times near Frewsburg, where Jackson grew up. Kiantone 
movement adherents, for example, lived during the 19th century in nearby 
woods, and Jackson as a boy and later studied them and explored that site. 
Lily Dale, located like Frewsburg in Chautauqua County, was a spiritualist 
community and is to this day. In 1910, as Jackson was graduating from 
Jamestown High School, over 5,000 Bible students—later they came to be 
called Jehovah’s Witnesses—met in Celoron, New York, adjacent to 
Jamestown at the foot of Chautauqua Lake, for a nine-day convention. In 
these direct senses, Jackson knew Jehovah’s Witnesses and people like them, 
and people unlike them, long before he became a judge. 
Jackson also knew the experience, from youth forward, of being outside 
the mainstream of unorthodox belief. He and his family were Democrats, a 
political minority in their places and times. They also were not churchgoers, 
unlike most of their neighbors—the Jacksons had a Bible in the house and 
some religious beliefs, but they were generally agnostic tending toward 
atheism. And what they experienced from their neighbors and in their 
communities was live-and-let-live tolerance. 
Robert Jackson had also direct experiences, which he remembered with 
chagrin, of acting intolerantly, ignorantly, toward people whose faiths 
differed from his own. On one boyhood occasion, when Robert, repeating 
ugliness that he had heard from some bigot, criticized Catholicism to an Irish 
girl who was working for his family, he was overheard by his mother and he 
got spanked. On another occasion, when Jackson, early in high school, 
attended a religious revival meeting and, with friends, behaved 
disrespectfully and annoyed the crowd, his father heard about it and cussed 
Robert out. He was raised not only to be idiosyncratic, but also to show 
respect for the unique beliefs of others. 
Jackson also remembered an experience of dealing with a preacher at 
the door. It involved both toleration and control of one’s domain. Robert was 
about age 12, home with his grandfather and baby sister. A fiery preacher 
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came to call. This predated the screen door, so the opened door meant 
unmediated contact. The preacher asked to pray for the grandfather’s soul. 
The old man, not much of a believer, said yes—but he also asked the preacher 
to keep it down, so as not to wake the baby. 
I do not think that it is stretching too far to see in these Jackson life 
moments some roots of the pragmatism, the balancing, the legal non-
doctrinalism, and the inclination to value every individual’s space and peace 
that one finds in his Douglas and Barnette opinions, a connected pair 
concerning where and the how the Constitution protects both Jehovah’s 
Witnesses and others. 
